Somalia is becoming Africa’s Lebanon

The weakness of the Somali state has allowed it to become an arena in which the geopolitical contest between Ethiopia and Egypt is played out. Somali leaders urgently need to adopt a new approach to repair their fragmented country.

The Horn of Africa, a region once described by Jeffrey Lefebvre as one of the world’s most “highly penetrated regional subsystems”, is on the brink of a dangerous turn as the several actors intensify their displays of power in Somalia. Turkey, Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, and other regional powers are taking sides in what is fast becoming Africa’s Lebanon—a fractured country where multiple national factions and entities pursue conflicting political agendas, inviting foreign actors to further their own influence and advance their political positions. The most prominent player in this new escalation is Egypt, which has begun to channel military experts and weaponry into Somalia to gain much needed leverage with Ethiopia in relation to the Nile water conflict. 

Recently, Egypt has sent large military aircraft and cargo ships to Mogadishu, delivering a significant quantity of weaponry. Additionally, Egypt has proposed deploying military contingents to the Horn of Africa nation as part of a newly adopted African peacekeeping mission. This rapid militarisation of the conflict has raised serious concerns in Ethiopia, Somaliland, and among certain Somali regional authorities. 

Addis Ababa has been at odds with Mogadishu since last January, following the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland, allegedly granting Ethiopia a 20-kilometre stretch of coastline for sea access. Relations have now hit a nadir not seen since the cold war years. SNTV is broadcasting footage of its army in 1977, the year Somalia launched an invasion of Ethiopia and Ethiopian officials have resorted to petty insults, calling the Somali foreign minister an “al-Shabaab agent”.  

SNTV is broadcasting footage of its army in 1977, the year Somalia launched an invasion of Ethiopia and Ethiopian officials have resorted to petty insults, calling the Somali foreign minister an “al-Shabaab agent”. 

As a counter-strategy to Egypt’s growing military involvement in Somalia, Ethiopia has increased its military presence in parts of the country, strengthened relations with Somali regional authorities, and, most notably, repositioned its eastern command (Hararghe command) to Godey, closer to the Somali border. Alongside this significant military posture, numerous videos have surfaced on social media showing an increased supply of weapons from Ethiopia to Somali federal authorities and influential clan politicians—some of whom are reportedly allies of the Somali president. 

Some of these weapons have been looted en route to their destinations by clan militias in the Galgaduud region of Somalia. In addition, Ethiopia has recently intensified its longstanding military cooperation with Somaliland, which shares similar concerns with Ethiopia and has accused Egypt of engaging in destabilising activities in the region aimed at Somaliland. 

The flood of arms into the country has prompted one analyst to remark that “soon there will be more guns than men in Somalia.”  

The tension between Somaliland and Egypt is a key factor in the region’s escalating conflict, as Egypt has pledged full support to Somalia in maintaining its territorial integrity, a stance that implicitly threatens Somaliland’s autonomy. In response, Somaliland last week closed an Egyptian cultural centre in Hargeisa and expelled the Egyptian staff overseeing it. 

Since 2011, the newly assertive Turkey has been working hard to establish a military presence in Somalia, as President Erdoğan seeks to expand Turkish influence in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, with ambitions that echo Ottoman-era aspirations. Mahmut Rıdvan Nazırlı, a member of Erdoğan’s ruling AKP who sits on the foreign affairs committee, viewed the maritime pact between Somalia and Turkey, as something which made his country a state that “has a say in the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.” Nazırlı added that Turkey had a historic role in the region dating to the 16th century. 

Since 2011, the newly assertive Turkey has been working hard to establish a military presence in Somalia, as President Erdoğan seeks to expand Turkish influence in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, with ambitions that echo Ottoman-era aspirations. 

Although Turkey has made significant investments in Somalia’s military training and security sectors, and secured strategic partnerships and trade agreements, its role in Somali politics has been more subtle. Turkey has carefully managed to downplay the competing priorities of Somalia’s political and ruling elites to avoid jeopardising its long-term strategic vision. It doesn’t want to hitch its future to any Somali actors political bandwagon. Nevertheless, Turkey’s presence has been enough to raise concerns among other regional powers, particularly Gulf states such as the UAE, which has its own ambitions in the Red Sea and adjacent Horn of Africa regions.  

Somalia, already fragile, has now become a battleground for a multi-party proxy war, with Ethiopia and Egypt playing the most prominent roles. The involvement of these two nations in Somalia has long been controversial and viewed with suspicion. Ethiopia and Egypt share deep-seated animosity and unresolved fears over the Nile’s waters. Addis Ababa sees the Nile as an Ethiopian resource heavily exploited by Egypt, while Cairo regards the Nile as a divine gift to Egypt. Indeed, the Greek historian Herodotus famously described Egypt as “the gift of the Nile” in the 5th century BC. 

Somalia, already fragile, has now become a battleground for a multi-party proxy war, with Ethiopia and Egypt playing the most prominent roles. The involvement of these two nations in Somalia has long been controversial and viewed with suspicion. 

In this deeply rooted conflict over the Nile, Somalia has been drawn into their rivalry since its independence. The Nile begins its journey in Ethiopia’s Lake Tana, flowing southeast towards Somalia before turning northward to Egypt, which claims the benefits of this natural resource. Meanwhile, Somalia, though not directly benefiting from the Nile, has borne the brunt of this geopolitical tension. Egypt has long viewed Somalia, including Somaliland, as Ethiopia’s vulnerable southern flank, due to its extensive border and ethnic ties that extend deep into Ethiopia’s heartland. During the cold war this led to blossoming ties between Mogadishu and Egyptian presidents from Nasser to Saddat.  

Conversely, Ethiopia regards Somalia and its Somali population as an immediate national security threat not just to the country’s territorial integrity but also the state.  

Egypt has long viewed Somalia, including Somaliland, as Ethiopia’s vulnerable southern flank, due to its extensive border and ethnic ties that extend deep into Ethiopia’s heartland. 

Based on these realities, both nations have historically supported opposing political factions and ideological groups in Somalia, with Ethiopia often holding the upper hand in shaping Somalia’s political landscape due to its much greater investment.  

Western powers, including the United States, have recently grown fatigued by Somalia’s persistent fragility and political turmoil. They are now seeking an exit strategy to alleviate the financial burden of Somalia, favouring a more active role for regional entities in addressing the country’s issues. The United States supports the involvement of the African Union (AU), IGAD, and the East African Community, of which Somalia has secured membership with US backing. However, current developments are not unfolding as the United States had planned or hoped. Instead, competing regional powers are exacerbating the state crisis in Somalia, undoing the modest gains of recent decades. This explains US objections to the memorandum agreed between Hargeisa and Addis Ababa. The US’s primary concern is the eradication or suppression of jihadist groups and current conditions provide them with an opportunity to flourish.  

Western powers, including the United States, have recently grown fatigued by Somalia’s persistent fragility and political turmoil. 

These growing interventions risk full-scale instability. Clan-based clashes are intensifying as the flow of weapons proliferates, particularly in the wake of Egypt’s military supplies to the struggling Mogadishu government and Ethiopia’s arms support to its allies, who oppose Egyptian involvement due to clan loyalties and concerns about possible al-Shabaab attacks.  

The current President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, is inviting proxy wars into his country, further dividing an already fractured Somalia and jeopardising the hard-earned legitimacy of the Federal Government of Somalia. His actions evoke comparisons to the situation in 1991 when Ali Mahdi installed himself as leader in the post-Siad Barre era with the backing of Egypt and Djibouti, but without the support of the broader Somali population. Ali Mahdi ultimately ruled a factional entity limited to a few neighbourhoods in Mogadishu, and his claim to the title of ‘Somali President’ remained controversial and divisive. 

The current President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, is inviting proxy wars into his country, further dividing an already fractured Somalia and jeopardising the hard-earned legitimacy of the Federal Government of Somalia. 

The region is heading towards considerable unrest, and beyond the political and geopolitical power struggles, many observers are concerned that these weapons pose a significant threat to the already fragile Somali state. There is growing fear that they will spark inter-clan conflicts, creating a highly fertile environment for anti-peace elements and extremist groups. The additional risk is that these arms fall into the hands of al-Shabaab.  

A new wave of violence looms over the region, with the prospect of bloody clashes on the horizon. Urgent political solutions are needed to address the underlying conflicts among Somalis, particularly the long-standing tension and unresolved state of affairs between Somalia and Somaliland. It is also essential to curb the ambitions of leaders who are consolidating power in what is barely a post-conflict state. Without an immediate change in approach, Somalia, like Lebanon, will remain a fragmented state, populated by self-serving elites seeking foreign patrons. It will remain in the clutch of its more powerful neighbours, and the voices of its citizens will continue to be muffled by a structure that fails to translate their wishes into policy.