Chad’s role in Sudan’s civil war 

Chad and Sudan have historically been inseparable due to communities that straddle the borders of both countries. Chad’s role in Sudan’s civil war today is rooted in this history, but is also defined by a new geopolitical landscape. 

Chad’s involvement in Sudan’s ongoing conflict raises crucial questions about regional stability and shifting alliances under the leadership of Mohamed Idriss Déby, commonly known as Kaka. Historically, Chad supported non-Arab rebel groups in their struggle against Arab-Sudanese factions backed by the Omar al-Bashir regime in Darfur. In response, Bashir armed Arab militias—originally known as the Janjaweed, now the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—to suppress the rebels and target civilians, some of whom had ethnic ties to Chad’s leadership in the early 2000s.

However, the current Chadian administration’s cooperation with the RSF marks a significant departure from the policies of Kaka’s late father, Idriss Déby, who was killed in 2021 during clashes with insurgents. This shift in policy raises important questions: What has driven this change, and what implications does it hold for both countries. 

From Itno to Kaka: Chad’s Sudanese policy shifts

Relations between Chad and Sudan have been complex and dense for much of the 2000s and continue to be so to the present day.

Idriss Déby, who died in 2021 and had led the country for almost half of its post-independence history at the time of his death, initially came to power after marching from Darfur to the capital, N’Djamena, and overthrowing his former superior, Hissène Habré (dubbed Africa’s Pinochet), in 1990. The relationship between Habré and Déby, once close, soured dramatically in the 1980s, leading Déby to stage a Libyan and Sudanese-backed coup against his former mentor. Habré himself came to power in 1982 after ousting Goukouni Oueddei, who had close ties with Muammar Gaddafi’s government in Tripoli – so there is a cyclical element to this. 

Déby garnered the support of members of his Zaghawa ethnic group, who straddle the border between eastern Chad and western Sudan (Darfur), and capitalised on the rivalry between Gaddafi and Habré, which became a source of arms, cash, and refuge for his fighters. This support enabled him to take control of N’Djamena and reshape the political landscape of Chad. When he seized the capital he said: “The moment has come to lay down our arms” but that wouldn’t be so. 

Ties between N’Djamena and Khartoum were initially good, as both Omar al-Bashir and Déby were in their rookie years as heads of state. Bashir also supported Déby’s coup. However, unlike Déby, Bashir’s Islamist regime harboured ambitions to expand its influence among neighbouring countries, supporting ideologically aligned groups from Eritrea to Egypt. Though this was not the primary cause of Bashir’s fallout with Déby, his new government was not shy about confronting its neighbours and attempting to shape the region more closely in its own image and had an arsenal of methods to do so.  

Under Idris Déby, Chad maintained strategic influence in its dealings with Sudan, grounded in the ethnic and political ties between Chad’s Zaghawa and the Zaghawa population in Darfur, despite the differences between the clans on either side of the border. Other ethnic groups, including the Masalit, and some Arab tribes also live on both sides of the border, so issues related to them were by definition transnational. 

In the early 2000s, tensions between Arab and non-Arab groups in Darfur grew increasingly violent, with the Khartoum government often backing Arab-identifying groups against the region’s other inhabitants. The Zaghawa were among those who fell out of favour with Khartoum. “After the 1989 coup, Zaghawa leaders were close to the NIF [Khartoum government] but, by 2000–01, many had become disenchanted,” wrote Victor Tanner and Jérôme Tubiana. They eventually joined an armed uprising against Bashir.

Déby didn’t automatically back the Zaghawa on the basis of shared ethnicity. When Bashir began struggling with an insurgency in the 2000s, Déby initially supported Khartoum’s measures – even militarily – to quell the rebels. In 2002, he met with a group of Sudanese Zaghawa alongside Khalil Ibrahim, an influential leader in the Justice and Equality Movement, in Chad. Following the meeting a close associate of Déby said: “There were a number of meetings… but the president was opposed to the [Darfur] rebellion.” 

Déby didn’t automatically back the Zaghawa on the basis of shared ethnicity. When Bashir began struggling with an insurgency in the 2000s, Déby initially supported Khartoum’s measures – even militarily – to quell the rebels. 

However, this position became increasingly difficult for Déby over time, as members of his own Zaghawa group, including family members and others with ethnic ties across the border, sympathised with their kinsmen in Sudan. This garnered support for the Sudanese Zaghawa in the form of money and weapons from segments of Chad’s society and military, prompting a response from Khartoum, which backed the Front Uni pour le Changement (FUC) in its attack on Adré in 2005. “It’s a tribal war that has become a problem between the two countries,” a N’Djamena based businessman told The New Humanitarian in 2004. 

Déby frequently provided military and political support to Darfuri anti-government armed groups fighting Khartoum’s central authority, with the aim of protecting Chad’s borders and preserving its strategic influence in Darfur. Déby’s regime played a pivotal role in strengthening these groups with arms and resources, serving as a buffer against the Sudanese government’s forces, including the Janjaweed militias, which later evolved into the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The RSF gained infamy for committing widespread human rights abuses in Darfur and beyond. 

Déby’s regime played a pivotal role in strengthening these groups with arms and resources, serving as a buffer against the Sudanese government’s forces, including the Janjaweed militias, which later evolved into the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Mohamed Kaka, however, has taken a different path since assuming power after his father’s death in 2021. Kaka has aligned Chad with the very forces his father fought, most notably the RSF. This shift marks a significant departure from Déby’s strategy of supporting Darfuri rebels against Khartoum’s Arab-backed militias, such as the Rapid Support Forces, even to the detriment of members of his own ethnic group, who have been repeatedly targeted by the RSF. 

What of Chad’s Zaghawa?

Since Chad’s independence in 1960, the country’s leadership has been dominated by elites from the northern part of the country, specifically from the Toubou and Zaghawa ethnic groups. Unlike Sudan’s Arab Riverine elite, Chad’s rulers have predominantly come from these Saharan ethnic minorities, with power concentrated in the hands of the military and northern tribes. 

This dynamic has resulted in a political landscape defined by ethnic rivalries, often exacerbating tensions between the north and the largely marginalised southern groups, who are predominantly non-Muslim. The rise of Mahamat Kaka Déby, 40, who came to power through a coup after his father was killed, marks a continuation of northern military rule but with new complexities in the ethnic and political landscape. 

Crucially, Kaka is only half Zaghawa and his mother is Gourane, another ethnic group which hasn’t enjoyed the same level of sway in N’Djamena. 

He has also confronted resistance from members of the old guard who were sceptical of his leadership from the outset. While he has managed to stabilise his government in the capital, the situation in Darfur presents a complex and unique challenge.

Kaka was initially neutral when the Sudan war began in 2023, closing the border with Sudan, except for refugees fleeing the conflict. He hosted the leaders of both belligerent parties, but by summer, he was unable to maintain his equidistant stance from the RSF and SAF and began supporting the RSF. 

Kaka was initially neutral when the Sudan war began in 2023, closing the border with Sudan, except for refugees fleeing the conflict. 

Kaka’s Zaghawa heritage adds a layer of complexity to his alliance with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Historically, the Zaghawa people have been in direct conflict with the Janjaweed militias, which later evolved into the RSF. During the Darfur conflict in the early 2000s, the Janjaweed were responsible for widespread atrocities against non-Arab ethnic groups, including the Zaghawa. These brutal campaigns left deep scars on the Zaghawa community, making Kaka’s partnership with the RSF — a force rooted in those Arab militias — particularly perplexing.

The Zaghawa, widely regarded as a martial ethnic group, have historically dominated many of Darfur’s main rebel movements. For example, Gibril Ibrahim, a Zaghawa and the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement, is currently Sudan’s finance minister. Minni Minawi, another Zaghawa from Sudan, leads the Sudan Liberation Movement.

The Zaghawa, widely regarded as a martial ethnic group, have historically dominated many of Darfur’s main rebel movements. 

Recent satellite imagery analysed by the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab reveals that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) burned 17 villages in Dar Zaghawa, north Darfur, between 2 and 12 October 2024, continuing a pattern of ethnic targeting against Zaghawa communities. The violence highlights the historic and ongoing tensions between Zaghawa communities and Arab militias, placing Chad’s Mohamed Kaka Déby in a precarious position like his father in the early 2000s. 

Although no official reason was provided, Kaka overhauled officials at the top of Chad’s army, gendarmerie, and police this month. Other reports suggest that Kaka is facing pushback from members of his own ethnic group for supporting the RSF.

Many Zaghawa within Chad still harbour deep resentment towards the RSF due to their violent history in Darfur. Kaka’s alignment with the RSF could intensify ethnic tensions within Chad, leading to political instability and potentially undermining his leadership. By aligning with a force long seen as an enemy of his ethnic base, Kaka risks alienating his Zaghawa supporters, who may view this as a betrayal of their historical struggles.

Many Zaghawa within Chad still harbour deep resentment towards the RSF due to their violent history in Darfur.

Sudan’s ongoing war is deepening internal divisions in Chad, particularly under President Kaka, whose policies have both directly and indirectly supported the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Despite his claims of neutrality, Déby’s government has allowed the RSF to move supplies, recruit fighters, and operate within Chad, alienating key factions within his regime who have kinship ties to Sudanese groups fighting against the RSF, such as the joint forces. Additionally, Déby’s appointment of General Ali Ahmat Aghabache, the deputy chief of the army, as his security and immigration minister — a figure with deep ties to the RSF — has stirred controversy. 

The UAE’s role

Chad’s recent alignment with the RSF cannot be fully understood without considering the role of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a key player in Sudan’s conflict. The UAE has long sought to expand its influence in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, viewing Sudan as a critical hub for advancing its broader geopolitical ambitions in the region. The UAE’s involvement in Sudan — particularly through its support of the RSF — plays a significant role in shaping the political and military landscape. 

The UAE has consistently denied involvement in Sudan’s civil war, but UN experts have said that Abu Dhabi is sending weapons to its ally through Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic and even Uganda. The New York Times has also reported on multiple occasions that the UAE has been providing support to the RSF under the guise of humanitarian aid through Amdjarass, a Chadian border city. May Darwich, a specialist in the role of Gulf countries in the Horn of Africa, recently pointed to the UAE’s agricultural and gold interests in Sudan as its primary motivation. Hemedti, the head of the RSF, acts as its local regent, facilitating the continued procurement of these goods. 

The RSF isn’t the only actor in the Sudanese civil war with foreign backers. The Sudanese military has also been receiving arms from Iran, according to reports. Qatari flights have also been tracked entering Sudan by the Ayin Network. 

 The UAE has consistently denied involvement in Sudan’s civil war, but UN experts have said that Abu Dhabi is sending weapons to its ally through Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic and even Uganda.

But the UAE is playing a key role in keeping N’Djamena on the RSF’s side through its own ties with the Kaka government. 

The UAE may have exerted significant pressure on Chad using financial incentives, investments, or security guarantees to sway Kaka’s government into cooperating with the RSF. These incentives could include aid, development projects, or military assistance — all of which are highly valuable to Chad, given its precarious position in a conflict-ridden region. 

Cameron Hudson, a former CIA analyst, now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told the Financial Times that he thinks the “Emiratis have bought the Chadians”. He added: “Déby is in a weak position internally and deciding that some combination of Emirati backing, RSF backing and now Russian backing, is a more secure hold on power for him than trying to be part of a western alliance”. 

For Kaka, the partnership with the RSF, facilitated by UAE backing, could be seen as a means to secure Chad’s borders, ensure external financial support, and strengthen his grip on power.

Moreover, the UAE’s broader interest in maintaining a foothold in African conflicts and influencing key regional dynamics extends beyond Sudan. By aligning Chad with the RSF, the UAE not only consolidates its position in Sudan but also strengthens its influence across the Sahel and beyond, positioning itself as a power broker in African affairs. This growing Emirati involvement may help explain Chad’s shift, despite the deep ethnic and historical tensions tied to the RSF.

However, this strategy carries considerable risks for Kaka, while the UAE’s support may offer short-term security and financial gains. It also binds Chad to a controversial and widely condemned paramilitary force. This could damage Chad’s international reputation, heighten internal dissent — particularly among Zaghawa communities — and entangle the country more deeply in the broader conflict dynamics of Sudan and the region. While the UAE’s role offers immediate benefits, it ultimately deepens Chad’s involvement in a highly complex and volatile conflict.