Are the Houthis really working with al-Shabaab?

On 11 June, CNN reported that discussions had been taking place between al-Shabaab and Ansar Allah (the Houthis) in Yemen regarding the possibility of the latter supplying weapons to the former. CNN cited three anonymous American officials, who stated that the US security establishment had learned of the talks, which were being treated with “considerable seriousness”. “This is a pretty active area of conversation that we’re having with countries on both sides of the Red Sea,” one of the officials said.

When one of the officials was asked whether this was being done at the direction of Tehran, which maintains close ties with the Houthi group, including supplying it with arms, the official expressed doubt, saying: “Houthis be a’ Houthi-ing on their own.”

A month later, James Kariuki, the UK deputy permanent representative to the UN, condemned the Houthis’ alleged links with al-Shabaab, calling it “a worrying trend.” While no concrete evidence has emerged to substantiate these claims, I recall that former secretary of state and former CIA director Mike Pompeo once warned Iran not to allow al-Qaida leaders to funnel money to al-Shabaab. Javad Zarif, Iran’s then foreign minister, categorically rejected Pompeo’s claims, and tweeted that there was a pattern of behaviour here. Pompeo, Zarif said, was “pathetically ending his disastrous career with more warmongering lies”.  

I have been reporting on Somalia for several years, and I must admit that the CNN report, along with the subsequent statement by British diplomat Kariuki, took me by surprise. Not only are the two groups ideologically opposed to one another (Sunni Jihadism versus Zaidi Shiism), but they also find themselves aligned geopolitically in contrasting ways despite having some shared overarching goals (hostility to the US, its Sunni allies and Israel). Christopher Anzalone is one of the world’s foremost experts on armed non-state actors, particularly the Houthis and al-Shabaab. He serves as a research assistant professor on Middle East Studies at the Krulak Center at Marine Corps University. He is also an adjunct professor of history and government at George Mason University (GMU).

The views expressed here are solely his own and do not reflect those of MCU, the US government, or GMU.

Below is my Q/A with him addressing some of these questions.
 

Faisal Ali: Let’s start at the beginning, as it were. How would you describe or characterise al-Shabaab and the Houthis, simply for the sake of providing the necessary context?  

Christopher Anzalone: In a nutshell, al-Shabaab is a Sunni jihadi organisation and one of the most powerful and enduring of al-Qaida’s regional affiliates. Its organisational ideology combines local (Somali), regional (Horn of Africa and “Greater Somalia”), and global (al-Qaida’s ideas on the interconnectivity of the ummah) elements. It rejects the legitimacy of the nation-state system, at least rhetorically. This stands in stark contrast to the Houthi Movement, which, de facto, accepts the nation-state as the principal political entity in the world. Indeed, the Houthis seek recognition—and currently claim the mantle—of the Yemeni nation-state. They even assert that their attacks on cargo ships in the Red Sea are carried out in the name of the “Armed Forces of Yemen” and the “people of Yemen.”

The Houthi movement refers to itself as “Partisans” or “Supporters” of God (Ansar Allah). The precursors to the modern movement emerged in the mid-1990s as part of a revival of Zaydism and Zaydi socio-political activism in the far north of Yemen, in the governorate of Sa'ada, near the border with Saudi Arabia. This revivalist movement was founded, in part, to advocate for Zaydi interests and, largely, to push back against the spread of Salafism in Sa’ada, a process accelerated by the return of Yemeni students from Salafi religious universities in Saudi Arabia, including the Islamic University of Medina. One of the key leaders of the Yemeni Salafi movement was the late Muqbil al-Wadi’i (d. 2001), who was born into a Zaydi family before becoming a Salafi and pursuing advanced religious education in Najran and Medina. Salafism in Yemen was particularly attractive to Yemenis born into Zaydi families who were not “sayyids”—descendants of the Prophet Muhammad—meaning they were excluded from higher advancement in the social, religious, and political circles in the Zaydi-dominated north.

FA: How seriously should we take these emerging reports of cooperation between al-Shabaab and the Houthis?  

CA: Reports of cooperation between al-Shabaab and the Houthis are concerning, given the energy both groups are expending on disrupting the security situation in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. However, we should also approach these reports with caution and evaluate the evidence on which they are based. In my view, the more likely scenario is a transactional relationship between individuals or smuggling/criminal networks affiliated with both groups, rather than a direct, close alliance or collaboration. This could be driven by profit or an “enemy of my enemy is my friend” type of strategic calculation.

FA: Sceptics might point to the fact that al-Shabaab is a takfiri group ideologically, viewing other Sunnis as non-believers, let alone a group associated with a completely different sect of Islam. But to what extent do considerations like this impact decision-making in situations where a group’s interests might be served through tactical cooperation?    

CA: Al-Shabaab has been open about its hostility towards Shi'ism and Shiite Muslims, categorising them as non-Muslims and actively preaching against them in areas under its control since at least 2011. It extends this hostility to Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and what it terms “extreme” Sufism, a label it applies to popular Somali Sufi practices. Al-Shabaab has been clear about its ambition to first take control of Somalia, before directing its efforts towards “liberating” Somali-majority regions in neighbouring countries, with particular attention focused on the Somali Region of Ethiopia and northeastern Kenya. Al-Shabaab’s rhetoric is local, regional, and global, though this mix is not always seamlessly integrated.

The Houthis, by contrast, are an avowedly Zaydi, Yemen-centred movement that seeks to control and be recognised as the legitimate government of Yemen. Whereas al-Shabaab rejects, at least rhetorically, the nation-state as a political entity, the Houthis' primary goal is to dominate a specific nation-state: Yemen.

There are, therefore, ideological and strategic impediments to a close alliance between al-Shabaab and the Houthis, who belong to a distinct sect of Shi'ism known as Zaydism. Zaydi practitioners are further subdivided into different groups. Zaydis differ theologically from the largest Shiite sect, the Ithna-Ashari or “Twelver” Shiites, although the Houthis have adopted some religious rituals typically associated with the Twelvers, rather than with the Zaydis. However, the Houthis have made it clear that, while they are allied with the Islamic Republic of Iran, they do not adhere to the concept of the “guardianship of the supreme jurist” (wilayat al-faqih in Persian and Arabic). These differences are not of great concern to most Sunni jihadis, influenced by and incorporating aspects of Salafism, given Salafism’s well-known hostility to non-Salafi Muslims, particularly Shiites and Sufis.

In my view, a more likely area for transactional relationships is in the realm of smuggling and other criminal networks operating on both sides of the Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea, with affiliations or other connections to both the Houthis and Al-Shabaab. There is a long history of trade and smuggling networks across the Red Sea, linking Yemen and other parts of the Arabian Peninsula with the Horn of Africa. There is also evidence of Iranian weapons making their way to Somalia. Al-Shabaab has recruited fighters from Somali refugees in Yemen, and more recently, there have been reports of Houthi-affiliated criminal networks openly selling weaponry and munitions. It is in this arena that, in my view, exchanges of weapons, munitions, and technology between the two groups are most likely to occur.

FA: Are you aware of many instances in the past where al-Qaida affiliates have cooperated with groups they might otherwise consider opponents, which demonstrate their flexibility in this regard?

CA: The late al-Qaida Central amir, Ayman al-Zawahiri, publicly advised al-Qaida affiliates and supporters not to pick fights with even “deviant” groups like Twelver, Isma’ili, or other Shiites, the Ahmadiyya, or even non-Muslim groups, unless those groups initiated the conflict. Even if these groups were the aggressors, al-Zawahiri recommended that Sunni jihadis only expend manpower and resources to the extent necessary to defend themselves and other Sunnis until the aggressors either give up or seek to end hostilities.

Historically, there have been instances where Sunni jihadis engaged in activities they condemned or which contradicted other principles they professed. Al-Qaida and its affiliates have engaged with tribal, clan, and other groups whose identities they believe should be subordinated to a shared Sunni Muslim identity. They have done this because they recognise that these other identities can be powerful motivators and organisers. Even Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) militants, who destroyed ancient archaeological sites and justified their actions by labelling these sites as polytheistic, engaged in extensive antiquities smuggling for profit. While fighting against the Syrian Ba’ath regime of Bashar al-Assad, Islamic State also profited from smuggling oil produced in areas under its control to the Syrian government.

Most jihadis, even those claiming ideological and theological purity, are often practical and strategic in their decision-making—they do what they believe will benefit them and their organisation the most. When there is little direct contact between two groups, such as al-Shabaab and the Houthis, it is always possible that the leadership and command structures within each group will see the relationship as potentially beneficial, with little downside, due to the different geographical areas of operation.

FA: The Iranians often describe their relationship with allied organisations in a similar way to how the US relates to fellow Nato states— as allies, not necessarily proxies. The intensity of their relations with these groups varies, but the Houthis are widely thought to have greater decision-making autonomy than, say, Hezbollah. How do you think Houthi/al-Shabaab cooperation would be perceived in Tehran?

CA: There are two schools of thought on this: one sees the Houthis as being much more directly aligned with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), while the other views them as more autonomous. In my view, the Houthis fall somewhere in between—significantly autonomous in their decision-making, but also more firmly within the IRI’s “Axis of Resistance” and sphere of influence than they were before 2014. It’s clear that the Houthis have become a central player within the “Axis of Resistance,” but their strategic utility to the IRI is more limited in terms of how effective they could be as a pressure point against Iran’s chief regional enemy, as perceived by the regime: Israel. This is partly due to the greater geographical distance between Yemen and Israel, as well as the Houthis' specific focus on ruling Yemen.    

For these reasons, the ideal armed group for the IRI is Hezbollah, due to its strategic location and long history of ties to Iran and the IRGC. However, the weakening of Hezbollah—due to targeted killings of senior leaders and operational commanders, and the loss of significant amounts of weaponry, equipment, and infrastructure—has seriously degraded the group’s ability to mount a large-scale pressure campaign on Israel’s northern front in the event of a full-scale war between Iran and Israel.

There have been claims that the IRI has provided various types of support to al-Shabaab, though the evidence for this, at least in open sources, is lacking. Weapons likely supplied by Iran to the Houthis in Yemen have, in some cases, made their way to Somalia, but the exact method of transfer remains unknown. It is more likely that longstanding smuggling channels between Yemen and the Horn of Africa facilitated the movement of these weapons across the Bab al-Mandab. I don't see a major strategic benefit for the IRI or the Houthis in directly arming al-Shabaab, particularly given the latter’s virulently anti-Shiite sentiments and admiration for one of the most notorious killers of Iraqi Shiites, the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Additionally, al-Shabaab’s capacity to directly conduct operations against the US or other targets the IRI may wish to target, particularly in maritime spaces, is quite limited. This, in turn, limits the group’s utility to the IRI.