East Africa experts react to Trump 2.0

Donald Trump’s victory in the US election over Kamala Harris promises major changes to the way US foreign policy is conceived, its goals, and how it is executed. Indeed, foreign policy was an important theme that Trump’s team emphasised as an area in which the Biden administration was failing throughout its campaign.  

The reaction of world leaders to Trump’s election reflects the change many are anticipating. Nayib Bukele, the self-proclaimed Philosopher-king of El Salvador posted: “I’m certain you don’t fully grasp the fork in human civilization that began yesterday.” French President Emmanuel Macron likened Europe to a “herbivore” surrounded by “carnivores” that may devour it, bizarrely urging fellow Europeans to become “omnivores”. Speaking at the Valdai Club this week, Vladimir Putin said that the world had reached a “dangerous point” as the former global order fades and the struggle to forge a new one begins.  

More prescient observers than Putin argue there wasn’t an order in the first place. Erdoğan’s intelligence chief, Ibrahim Kalin, then a government spokesperson, updated Voltaire’s quip about the Holy Roman Empire being neither “holy, nor Roman, nor an empire” as he described the current world order as “neither new, nor global, nor an order.” “There is a pyramid with smaller countries at the bottom,” said Kalin. The Guardian’s diplomatic correspondent, Patrick Wintour, called it a “world disorder”.  

Countries have begun taking precautions for what they believe is likely to be a more unpredictable international environment. To understand the implications for east Africa, we have gathered insights from some of the region's leading experts, who share their views on the potential impact across the various countries and issues within the region.

Joshua Merservey - USA

Joshua Meservey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, where he specialises in great power competition in Africa, African geopolitics, and counterterrorism. Previously, he was a research fellow for Africa at the Heritage Foundation and the Atlantic Council’s Africa Center.

President Trump is famously a dealmaker and a businessman, and his administration’s policy toward east Africa will likely reflect that reality. He will try to make the focal point of US engagement there trade and investment—his signature Africa program during his first term, Prosper Africa, explicitly focused on those elements—which may mean pursuing bilateral trade agreements, including resurrecting the one with Kenya his administration was negotiating at the end of his first term. He will be far more positive about gas and oil projects than the Biden administration, so the US should be more willing to provide funding for such endeavours.

Relatedly, I expect his administration to take a largely pragmatic approach to African countries that will include fewer public lectures about democracy and human rights as conceived by the American political left. The US will continue to care about those issues as they are baked into our foreign policy apparatus, but the Trump administration may seek new and subtler ways to promote them. His pragmatism is an opportunity for all African countries to present a mutually beneficial deal to the administration. His approach to the Sudan crisis will likely focus on ensuring American adversaries do not take advantage of the war and working with partners to try to ameliorate and ultimately negotiate an end to the conflict.

President Trump is also wary of long-running, and particularly multilateral, projects with an unclear record of success. Furthermore, a major element of his campaign was touting his record for avoiding wars, and at the end of his first term he removed US troops from Somalia. This all suggests his administration will reexamine the support it gives to the AU mission in Somalia and to the federal government in Mogadishu, and will likely again remove US troops from the country. However, he’s unlikely to abandon the fight against al-Shabaab given the danger it poses and may shift more US resources and focus to partner countries that are fighting the group. His administration, in concert with congress, will likely aggressively investigate and punish the misuse and theft of American aid money as well.

Faisal Roble - Ethiopia

Faisal Roble is a writer, researcher and political analyst focused on the Horn of Africa. He is the former editor of the WardheerNews website.  

The first Trump administration sought to cut foreign aid to Ethiopia, and it is plausible that the same policy will be pursued again. Americans who propelled the Republicans into office would find it difficult, if not unforgivable, to write cheques worth billions of dollars to assist a distant country like Ethiopia, particularly with no significant transactional return for Trump and his agenda. Should any economic engagement between the two countries be expected, Trump would want to see a streamlined and improved investment environment in Ethiopia. However, this is unlikely due to the ongoing civil war, the country’s slow and cumbersome rules for investment, and Addis Ababa’s reliance on Chinese foreign investment. More economic engagement with Addis Ababa may, therefore, not be anticipated during Trump’s era.

The most consequential policy change that could negatively impact Ethiopia would be Trump’s stance on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Gerd). In his previous term, Trump firmly aligned himself with Egypt’s President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi. In October 2020, Trump said Cairo may “blow up that dam” if a deal wasn’t secured. Trump does not understand why Ethiopia would not negotiate with Egypt, whose very existence as a nation depends on the waters provided by the Nile; this seems to him a simple and rational thing to do, given his long-standing preference for negotiation. Furthermore, Trump is likely to favour Egypt due to the peace accord it has long maintained with Israel. For these two reasons, Trump would most likely pressure Ethiopia to negotiate with Egypt over the Gerd. Ethiopia may not see any alternative to following Trump’s advice, as the alternative could be far worse; he could feasibly side with Egypt once more, as he did during his previous administration, further isolating a battered and economically weak Ethiopia.  

Mohamed Kheir Omer – Eritrea

Mohamed Kheir Omer is an Eritrean writer, researcher, and archivist. He is a former member of the Eritrean Liberation Front, an organisation that fought against Ethiopia for Eritrea’s independence.

I do not believe that relations between Eritrea and the United States will change following the re-election of Donald Trump, although Eritrea’s president is hopeful that the “election will open a new chapter of fruitful and constructive ties of cooperation between Eritrea and the United States”. The Eritrean regime has never abandoned its interest in the US, particularly in the Republican party. However, the US has historically been disinclined to engage–even placing the regime under sanctions. In 2017, following Trump’s initial election as president, Eritrea sent a dossier detailing how successive Democratic administrations had mistreated the country. Despite this, Donald Trump showed no interest, not even in issuing a response.

Another point of contention between Trump and the Eritrean government is the persecution of evangelical and Pentecostal Christian denominations within Eritrea. In July 2019, President Trump met with survivors of religious persecution, including Eritrean gospel singer Helen Berhane. When she recounted being held in a metal shipping container for 32 months because of her faith, he was visibly shocked, repeating in disbelief, “In a shipping container, thirty-two, thirty-two months.”  

Mohamed Gello - Kenya

Mohamed Gello is a former career diplomat with over three decades of experience in the Kenyan foreign service. He has served as ambassador to South Korea and the UAE, and has also held diplomatic postings for Kenya in China and Washington, DC.

Given Kenya’s strategic role in Africa, a Trump administration would view Kenya as a key ally, especially in countering the influence of China and Russia. Security cooperation will remain a central pillar of this in Somalia as well where Kenya plays a key role in the battle against al-Shabaab. The Trump administration’s attitude to migrants – note the cats and dogs speech – will also mean he will back Kenya’s leadership in the Haiti security mission, particularly if it transitions into a UN-led mission, in line with Trump’s preference for burden-sharing in global security.

Economically, Trump became the first president to negotiate a trade deal with Kenya towards the end of his first term. Since then, Biden has expanded and strengthened ties with Kenya on both military and economic fronts. Kenya has faced significant economic challenges, which have led to political repercussions this summer, making trade relations with the United States all the more vital. However, scaled-back climate policies might reduce US funding for renewable energy projects in Africa, while cuts to foreign aid could impact support for health, education, and infrastructure projects across the continent, prompting African nations to seek alternative partners. Additionally, stricter immigration policies could affect Kenyan nationals in the US and future travellers.

Overall, Kenya can expect a pragmatic, business-centred relationship under Trump, focused on security, trade, and countering Chinese and Russian influence.

Mursal M Khaliif – Somalia

Mursal M Khaliif is a Somali MP. He sits on the parliament’s defence select committee and is a chairman of the bicameral committee on friendship with the United States.

Donald Trump has previously withdrawn US troops from Somalia and has strongly signalled an isolationist approach to US foreign policy. For Somalia, currently embroiled in conflict with al-Shabaab, this stance presents both challenges and opportunities for the government. Primarily, it provides an impetus for Somalia to focus more effort and attention on developing its indigenous defence capabilities through the Somali National Army (SNA). In this context, Somalia is now operating in a foreign policy environment where it can diversify its range of security partners in this conflict and has already begun to do so by strengthening ties with Türkiye and, more recently, Egypt. Cairo and Ankara can also serve as important channels for Somalia to maintain American engagement. Both Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Egypt’s Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, who are familiar with the issues facing Somali policymakers, enjoy strong relationships with Trump, which may benefit Somalia in the future.  

Somali leaders, however, must make the case for US support now. They need to present a compelling argument for why US engagement and backing would be mutually beneficial—something they can no longer assume will be the case by default. A narrow window of opportunity remains to influence the general direction of the Trump administration, but it is closing quickly.  

The broader dynamics of the region have also shifted substantially. Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly expressed a desire to annex parts of Somalia. It should be noted that Abiy Ahmed does not have a strong relationship with the Trump administration and has presided over a period in which Ethiopia–US relations have ebbed. During the Tigray war, Trump removed Ethiopia from the African Growth and Opportunity Act trade preference programme and openly aligned with Sisi on the dam issue. Ethiopia’s exclusion from the next African Union mission also reduces its influence as a frontline state in the battle against al-Shabaab, the most dangerous and versatile terrorist organisation in Africa.  

Abdisalam Yassin – Somaliland

Professor Abdisalam Yassin is academic, politician and a founding member of the Somali National Movement.

In recent years, Somaliland has made significant efforts to cultivate ties with key figures close to the Republican Party, successfully positioning itself in those circles as a potential ally for the US in a strategically important region. This became evident during President Muse Bihi’s visit in March 2022. His visit was preceded by that of Essa Kayd, who had made similar rounds; however, Bihi’s visit firmly set the tone for where Somaliland places its hopes regarding progress on the question of its international status.  

Somaliland has positioned itself as an asset to the US on two key fronts, both of which are likely to grow in significance: as a bulwark against Chinese influence in Africa and as a secure base from which the US can counter Iran’s proxies—namely, the Houthis—as they disrupt global shipping in the Red Sea. If Trump appoints hawkish figures who view the region exclusively through this lens, it could be a boon for Somaliland.

In terms of personnel, Somaliland is also likely to see more of its sympathisers, such as Peter Pham, take prominent positions in the incoming administration. A stronger Republican grip on the Senate will further empower James E. Risch, another ally of Somaliland, to keep it on the agenda and to ensure that opportunities to deepen Hargeisa’s cooperation with Washington are pursued. Crucially, another determining factor will be whether policy on the Horn of Africa is dominated by the Pentagon and the Senate or by the State Department. Somaliland has closer ties with the former two and weaker connections with the latter.

Kholood Khair – Sudan

Kholood Khair is a political analyst with a focus on Sudan and the founding director of Confluence Advisory.  

Project 2025, Trump’s prefabricated policy framework spanning 900 pages, includes precisely two paragraphs on Africa, offering a clear indication of the likely foreign policy priorities for the incoming administration. These two paragraphs barely diverge from Biden’s approach, mentioning trade and Africa’s strategic geographic significance. Similarly, the historically low priority that Trump’s team has placed on Africa seems to align closely with the current administration’s stance; Biden, like Trump, has yet to set foot in Africa.

Sudan, however, alternates between the State Department’s Bureau for African Affairs and the Near East Bureau, depending on the administration in office. As in Trump’s first term, any engagement with Sudan is likely to be mediated once again through his signature Middle East policy, the Abraham Accords. Trump will be eager to secure a Saudi-Israeli normalisation, a goal rendered increasingly complex following the events of October 7th. Yet the Saudis, now adept at leveraging the prospect of normalisation to gain concessions from Washington, may demand American support for their preferred faction in Sudan, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). This support could, they hope, help ensure that the Red Sea—where their trillion-dollar development project, Neom, is located—remains stable, if not peaceful, under the control of a supportive Sudanese ally.

Meanwhile, the UAE, now a key player in the Abraham Accords and recently designated a preferred US defence partner, could use its influence to advocate for the SAF in its engagements with Trump’s adversary, Iran, favouring its own preferred proxy, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Both SAF and RSF, along with their regional allies, understand that Trump is more likely than a Democratic president to take sides in Sudan’s ongoing conflict, and each faction hopes to strike a favourable deal with the “Dealmaker-in-Chief”.

In short, Trump’s policy on Sudan will likely be shaped by considerations beyond Sudan itself—once again.

On the Hill, Republican control of the Senate and the House could help the White House in streamlining its Sudan policy, but unlike the White House, Congressional Republicans view Sudan through an African, rather than Middle Eastern, lens. And while Congress may prefer a diplomacy-based approach, the White House will likely mirror US allies and take a security-based approach to Sudan. This difference in perspective may lead to prioritisation asymmetries and complicate the coordination of a cohesive Sudan strategy.

Support for democratic reforms is likely to decline if a deal between SAF and RSF is pursued, with Israel—an ally to both SAF and RSF—likely playing a greater role. There may be no US Envoy to Sudan for some time, if ever, and the US approach to Sudan could become increasingly militarised, with diplomacy receding into the background. However, the most significant shift may be in the realm of aid. Project 2025 reflects its drafters’ deep-seated aversion to international assistance and will likely lead to severe cuts in USAID funding, which would gravely impact Sudan, currently facing the world’s most severe crises in humanitarian, hunger, displacement, and protection needs.

Jok Madut Jok – South Sudan

Jok Madut Jok is a professor of anthropology at Syracuse University. Jok’s areas of specialism include security, governance, democracy and development in South Sudan. He is the author of Breaking Sudan, Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence and War and Slavery in Sudan.

Since its secession from Sudan in 2011, the government of South Sudan has faced harsh criticism and reprimands from US administrations. The United States was instrumental in South Sudan’s independence; however, Washington has since expressed significant disappointment with South Sudanese leaders over a range of issues, including corruption, human rights abuses stemming from the civil war that erupted in 2013, and Juba’s apparent reluctance to implement the 2015 and 2018 peace agreements intended to end nationwide violence, improve public services, and enhance the welfare of citizens. In response, the US and other donor countries have withdrawn development aid, imposed targeted sanctions on senior government officials, issued travel advisories discouraging non-essential travel to South Sudan, and downgraded diplomatic relations with Juba—all in efforts to compel political change that would steer South Sudan towards a democratic transition.

It was with the hope of improving these strained relations that many South Sudanese were closely watching the US elections, as the administration of Joseph Biden had shown scant interest in South Sudan. The election of former President Donald J. Trump was met with considerable enthusiasm among South Sudanese, largely due to the president-elect’s personal appeal and a long-standing memory of the Republican party’s historic commitment, particularly that of President George W. Bush, to South Sudan’s autonomy. Many South Sudanese are now hoping that Trump’s administration will resume its role as South Sudan’s primary aid donor, lift sanctions and the United Nations Security Council’s arms embargo, and exert diplomatic pressure on Juba to prioritise peace.  

In my view, a Trump administration is unlikely to view South Sudan as a foreign policy priority any more than it did during his previous term—unless South Sudan’s political leadership initiates its own reform programmes that might attract Washington’s attention, particularly in the areas of human rights, peace-building, and a demonstrated political will to promote democracy and plan elections in the near future. If such reform efforts prove genuine and steadfast, the people of South Sudan may yet succeed in rekindling US interest in re-engaging with Juba.