What do checkpoints tells us about how Somali clans relate to land?

In a newly published paper, a group of researchers argue that checkpoints in Somalia provide us with an opportunity to explore and think about how clans make claims to land and why, in a new analysis that has important implications for how we think about Somali state-building.  

In early August, Jethro Norman published a working paper along with two colleagues, Abdirahman Edle Ali and Peer Schouten (Mr Roadblock), exploring the operations of checkpoints in Somalia. Anyone who has ever travelled through the country will have encountered them as they’re ubiquitous these days. 

They’re often formed by groups of young men typically armed with AK47s. What constitutes the barrier varies from a few large stones placed in the middle of a road to large chains tied between trees completely blocking transit. The person manning the barrier usually sits in shade nearby with a bit of tea and a pack of cigarettes to pass the time. When you pull up, you’ll stop and if the checkpoint guy is in a good mood there will be pleasantries before a fee is requested which you’re expected to handover.  

This phenomenon is quite a widespread one in countries where state authority is weak, but Norman, Ali and Schouten argue that their research found that in Somalia isn’t necessarily a sign of state failure or an obstacle to state-building but has deeper roots in how Somali clans relate to land and rely on the regulation of transit as a means to generate income.  

You can find the pull paper here which we encourage all readers to check out. Below is an interview with one of the authors, Jethro Norman, who is a postdoctoral researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies and an ethnographer who has a specialist focus on Somalia.  

Faisal Ali: What drew you and your co-authors to think about checkpoints as a productive and insightful aspect of Somali life for this type of in-depth look?  

Jethro Norman: Checkpoints were of interest to us because they do not neatly fit into conventional categories of state or non-state authority. While they can reflect administrative borders and government revenue strategies, they may also embody clan-based claims to control passage and access to resources. Essentially, we began to view checkpoints as a microcosm of Somali society, offering a unique lens through which to examine the complex interplay of factors shaping Somali life. Our idea was that by analysing what actually happens at checkpoints, rather than merely seeing them as obstacles to state-building or signs of state failure—narratives that dominate discussions—we could develop a more nuanced understanding of Somali political and social dynamics. 

FA: So, you’re arguing that we shouldn’t simply assume checkpoints are obstacles to state-building or signs of state failure but something entirely new. How does that map onto the emergence of clan-based federal states?  

JN: Whilst we don’t offer a direct causal explanation for the emergence of clan-based federal states, what we do argue is that the interplay between clan territorial claims, identity, and control over trade routes, as manifested through isbaaro, has shaped the Somali political landscape in ways that are relevant to understanding the development of clan based federal states.  

First, there is a long-standing connection between clan territoriality and control over trade routes in Somalia. In the 19th century, the absence of a centralised authority led to a system where clans effectively controlled their own territories, extracting transit fees (abanship) from caravans passing through. This historical precedent established a pattern where clan identity and territorial control, particularly over economically significant areas, became intertwined.  

The proliferation of checkpoints, especially following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, marked a resurgence of this pattern. As the central government disintegrated, clans reasserted control over their territories, using isbaaro as both a means of generating revenue and a visible symbol of their authority. This period, often called the “isbaaro wars,” underscored the deep connection between clan identity, territorial control, and access to resources in the Somali context. Today, checkpoints often involve a complex web of relationships between clan militias, local administrations, and federal forces. This fluidity and adaptability of isbaaro reflects a broader pattern in Somali politics, where formal state structures often overlap and compete with clan-based systems of authority.  

So, this dynamic, where clan control over territory and resources has been a persistent feature of Somali political life, I think has quite clearly influenced the emergence of clan-based federalism. In the absence of a strong central government capable of asserting its authority across the country, federalism, with its emphasis on power-sharing and decentralised governance, likely emerged as a pragmatic compromise, reflecting the reality of deeply entrenched clan-based power structures.  

FA: What did you assume about the differences between the way clans related to land and the way modern state-like institutions relate to land which has informed your research on a conceptual level?  

JN: Clans have a relationship with land that is fundamentally different from how modern states typically relate to territory. The relationship between clan identity and territorial control is rooted in historical patterns of pastoralism, trade, and conflict, in which land as not merely physical space, but a domain imbued with social and cultural significance, shaping identity, social organisation, and political dynamics. For example, the historical practice of abanship, where clans would extract transit fees from caravans passing through their territory, predates the modern Somali state. On the one hand, this shows that clans have long viewed and utilised land as a resource to be controlled and leveraged for economic gain and social influence. However, these territorial claims were shifting and fluid, contingent on genealogical claims to territory.   

By contrast, we tend to think about the state and its claims to territory in terms of linear and highly demarcated borders. We see some of these tensions arise today in northern Somalia, between the differing claims of Somaliland and Puntland over the contested SSC regions. Somaliland bases its claims on the borders of the colonial British Somaliland state, whereas Puntland’s claim is genealogical – that the clan that inhabits much of these areas is from the same Harti clan family. Of course, the key difference is that over time, genealogical groups expand, contract and move across space. State-territorial borders, on the other hand, are cartographic abstractions and remain static.   

At the same time, it’s important to note that we also argue against a simplistic dichotomy between clan-based and state-centric approaches to land and authority. Instead, we emphasise the fluidity and adaptability of Somali checkpoints, highlighting how they can simultaneously serve both clan interests and state objectives.  

FA: Your research showed that marginal communities and minorities suffer the most as clans stake claims to territories with checkpoints. What kinds of experiences are they subject to?  

JN: Marginalised communities and minorities in Somalia suffer disproportionately from the isbaaro system, facing exploitation and exclusion from economic opportunities. This marginalisation stems from the lack of influence within the dominant clan structures that underpin the checkpoints and control access to trade routes and resources.   

In this paper, for example, we highlight how minority communities involved in agriculture, such as the Bantu Somalis and Reewin communities in the Juba and Shebelle River valleys, are particularly vulnerable. These communities often face a dense network of checkpoints along their transportation routes, leading to exorbitant cumulative transit taxes. This effectively siphons off a significant portion of their earnings, trapping them in a cycle of poverty and dependence.  

What we found is that minority farmers often lack the clan connections needed to navigate the checkpoint system effectively. As a result, they are often unable to transport their produce to markets themselves and must rely on traders from the majority clans, who further exploit their position by paying depressed farm-gate prices and controlling access to urban consumers.   

The isbaaro system also indirectly impacts marginalised communities by driving up the cost of essential goods and services. Since checkpoints are ubiquitous along major transportation routes, the costs associated with transit taxes are passed down to consumers in the form of higher prices for necessities. This disproportionately affects minority communities, who are already economically disadvantaged and have limited purchasing power.  

The exploitative nature of the isbaaro system, particularly for marginalised groups, may even contribute to support for alternative systems of authority, such as al-Shabaab. As many will know, of course, al-Shabaab also extracts taxes and operates its own network of checkpoints, but it often portrays itself as a provider of “redistributive justice,” potentially resonating with communities who feel neglected or exploited by the dominant clan-based system.  

In short, because the checkpoint system favours those with strong clan affiliations, it reinforces existing power imbalances and perpetuates the marginalisation of minority communities.  

FA: You’ve used the word schismogenesis to describe the social fragmentation caused by Somali clans: that is when people essentially reinforce very local identities through the policing of their boundaries and defining in and out groups. Did your research reveal much about what type of danger actors in these liminal spaces felt their activities posed for the emergence of a central authority and a national identity? Did they not care about that?  

JN: In this paper, we don’t directly address how actors involved in checkpoint operations articulate their actions in relation to the emergence of a central authority or national identity in Somalia. However, we do argue that checkpoints serve as both a reflection and a driver of schismogenesis within Somali clan structures. Basically, this means that the potential for economic gain through checkpoint control incentivises the fragmentation of clans into smaller units, each vying to control transit taxes. The various actors involved in checkpoint operations, particularly those associated with clan militias, likely view their actions through the lens of clan interests and local power dynamics rather than through a broader national lens. Whether this is consciously expressed as anti-state is a very interesting question, and one that deserves further investigation. Presumably, this probably varies from location to location. What is clear, however, is that the current political economy is structured towards increasing decentralisation and fragmentation – a big problem for those promoting the reconstitution of a strong central state in Somalia.  

Over the next years, we plan to do more interviews and ethnographic studies focusing on checkpoint operators, precisely to gain a more nuanced understanding of how these actors view their actions in relation to concepts of central authority and national identity.  

FA: What implications do you think your research should have about the way we think about the current method of state-building taking place in Mogadishu? 

JN: Our research strongly suggests that the international community’s goal of resuscitating a centralised and unified Somali state may be fundamentally misaligned with the realities of power and authority in Somalia. The deep-rooted isbaaro system, with its emphasis on clan-based control over movement and resources, presents a formidable obstacle to centralising power. Despite decades of repeated efforts to foster a national identity and build centralised institutions, clan-based networks and allegiances continue to shape the distribution of power, access to resources, and the dynamics of conflict and cooperation. More pervasive still, our research suggests that external interventions, often intended to support state-building, may inadvertently reinforce the very clan-based power structures they aim to transcend. The reliance of international actors on clan networks for logistical ease and security can result in the channeling of resources through these networks, bolstering their influence and hindering the development of more inclusive and accountable institutions.   

We need to rethink conventional state-building approaches in Somalia, moving away from externally imposed solutions that may not align with local realities and power dynamics. Instead, the sources imply that more sustainable and effective state-building efforts should be prioritised. Ultimately, this means recognising and engaging with the complexities of clan-based authority rather than attempting to impose a top-down model of governance. In a more theoretical sense, this means working with rather than against the powerful forces of schismogenesis, whilst also prioritising inclusive political settlements that address the concerns of marginalised communities and mitigate the more exploitative aspects of schismogenesis.