How Sudan’s army made gains against RSF 

Sudan’s army began an offensive against Rapid Support Forces at the end of September and has gained the initiative against the paramilitary group partially by relying on international support.   

Since military clashes began in Sudan 17 months ago between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the conflict has resulted in the world’s worst and largest humanitarian crisis. Currently, 25 million Sudanese people, including 14 million children, are in urgent need of humanitarian aid, and famine has been declared in the Zamzam refugee camp, where one child dies every hour. That is the roughly equivalent of a classroom of children in just one refugee camp every day.   

In addition to being the world’s largest displacement crisis—with over 10.7 million Sudanese internally displaced and nearly 2 million having fled to neighbouring countries—more than 70% of health facilities in conflict-affected areas are either non-functional or only partially functional. The conflict has also led to severe human rights violations, war crimes, crimes against humanity, hate speech inciting civil war, and the weaponisation of sexual violence, including rape and gang rape, along with the use of famine for political gain by the warring factions. A UN panel of experts has said both the SAF and the RSF are using “food as a weapon and starving civilians.” The great irony is that, while all this unfolds, the world’s major media outlets describe Sudan as a forgotten or ignored war, yet they fail to report on the true scale of suffering in the country.    

For the last few months, the conflict had largely come to a halt around relatively stable frontline. Gains were made by the RSF in Darfur during the second half of 2023 who have now concentrated their firepower on El Fasher, but after early victories elsewhere in the country, it didn’t appear likely that major battlefield changes would occur. However, the army has since reversed the RSF’s advance and has been pushing the militia back in and around the capital, Khartoum, and the surrounding areas.   

SAF advancing after 17 months   

In the first seventeen months after the outbreak of fighting in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the SAF had faced repeated defeats, resulting in the loss of most areas in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, as well as the states of Al-Jazirah and Sennar, and the Darfur region.     

These ongoing setbacks have raised numerous questions about the reasons behind the SAF’s withdrawal from its controlled areas with little resistance, as well as the prolonged encirclement of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the commander-in-chief of the SAF, at the army headquarters in the centre of the capital for months before he managed to leave in an operation that remains unexplained to this day. The Sudan War Monitor (SWM) blog speculated the following at the time: “One possibility is that he slipped out in an armed convoy, or by helicopter, and another possibility is that the RSF allowed him to leave as a result of ongoing secret negotiations.” Prior to this he hadn’t been seen in public since the start of the war. He has since carried out international tours around Africa and the Middle East and even attended the UN general assembly in September.   

During his time in New York, the Sudanese army launched its offensive against the RSF in the tri-city area, the largest in four months. Al Jazeera’s Sudan correspondent, Hiba Morgan, reported that “Heavy artillery fired, military planes flying overhead.” The army launched its attacked from Omdurman into Khartoum in the early morning, whilst telecommunications were cut off in parts of the city. SAF soldiers advanced from the Engineers Corps base, crossing into the al-Morgan neighbourhood. The attack, which took place on 26 September, was the first time RSF troops were caught completely blindsided by an SAF operation. By the end of September, the military had taken control of the “third bridge in three days”, according to SWM.   

The army has pressed its advantage, whilst the RSF has claimed that Egypt is also participating in strikes against its positions, which Cairo has denied, challenging Hemedti to offer proof.   

For much of the conflict the Sudanese army has looked weaker on the ground than the SAF and addressing that weakness with international support has contributed to making the current offensive possible.   

The empowerment of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) dates back to the era of former president Omar al-Bashir. During this period, the RSF received backing from Bashir to suppress rebels in Darfur, which led to it being colloquially referred to as the “SAF’s infantry”. As it entrenched itself in Darfur, the RSF then proceeded to enhance its power and prestige by entering the gold mining sector and sending mercenaries to fight in Libya and Yemen. He eventually turned on his former boss, ousting him in 2018, and subsequently became a significant figure in Sudan in his own right, pursuing a foreign policy independent of the Sudanese government. He now looks to Benghazi in Libya, Chad, the UAE and the Central African Republic for support.   

Hemedti’s associates have formed alliances with unorthodox characteristics, which are driven by “mutual need,” according to Anas El Gomati, director of the Sadeq Institute. “Hemedti's alliances are like a high-stakes game of geopolitical Jenga”, he says. “Each player – whether in Khartoum, Benghazi, or Abu Dhabi – is both a critical support and a potential point of collapse.”   

This has provided the RSF with a lifeline through Chad, a neighbouring Emirati ally, where numerous reports have alleged that arms have been smuggled to the RSF. Abu Dhabi has denied allegations that it is involved in arming any party to Sudan’s conflict.   

Weapons are also being smuggled through other neighbouring countries like Libya and the Central African Republic which are “major arms-trafficking hubs”.   

For Sudan’s army on the other hand, despite spending over 70% of its budget on the security sector, much of this funding was spent on salaries, bonuses for senior officers, and military investments in the economy, leaving the SAF under-resourced and not well-trained.  

To balance this the SAF’s leadership has leant into its official role as the government of Sudan to cultivate ties with other countries in search of arms.   

The Washington Post has reported that Sudan has been using Iranian-supplied drones, citing the Sudan Conflict Observatory (SCO). The SCO stated that seven flights took place between Iran and Sudan between December 2023 and July 2024. Four of these flights landed at an Iranian Air Force apron in Tehran, while three disabled their flight tracking devices upon landing in Iran. Lieutenant General Yasser al-Atta, Sudan’s assistant commander-in-chief, denied that the military had recently received Iranian drones. However, another anonymous security official said that the drones had been received.  

The two countries have also exchanged ambassadors again after almost a decade and Sudan’s foreign minister attended the inauguration of Iran’s new president, Masoud Pezeshkian.    

This is probably one part of what Al-Atta has said is a new “international alliance” to help Sudan receive arms.   

The formation of this alliance, along with general Al-Atta’s confirmation of receiving new weapons—more of which are on the way—marked a turning point that shifted the SAF from a defensive to an offensive stance. Recently, the Ayin Network monitored ongoing air bridges operated by Qatari Air Force private and military cargo planes to Port Sudan, in addition to Iranian cargo planes. General Yassir Al-Atta also confirmed during an interview with Saudi Arabia’s Al Arabiya channel that Russia had promised military support in exchange for a naval base.  

The SAF has managed to advance in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, by gaining control of the three main bridges connecting the capital to its surrounding cities. Sky News correspondent, Yousra Elbagir, entered a territory the military cleared, showing widespread damage, debris, bullet scarred walls and cars and household furniture scattered along the streets.   

The primary objective of the offensive is to connect the army’s military barracks in the capital, facilitating the delivery of military support and enabling coordinated attacks from multiple fronts on RSF-held areas. Additionally, the SAF has made progress in the southern Sennar State, beginning to reclaim some of the strategic locations it had lost in recent months. There are also expectations that the SAF will launch attacks towards Al-Jazira State and the Darfur region.  

These developments clearly indicate that the war in Sudan is not, and will not remain, a purely internal conflict. The involvement of new parties in fuelling this war signals that there is no imminent end in sight for the devastating conflict, prolonging the suffering of the Sudanese people.