Somaliland beyond the ballot box

The upcoming presidential election will be contested by three parties: the ruling Kulmiye party, led by President Muse Bihi Abdi; the Waddani party, with its presidential candidate Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro); and the Justice and Welfare Party (UCID), headed by Faisal Ali Hussein (Warabe). The two main candidates, Abdirahman Irro and President Muse Bihi represent two different facets of Somaliland’s political and social elite and plan to implement competing foreign policies, yet both carry the weight of well-established business and clan interests that complicate the prospects for meaningful change.

For the first time in Somaliland’s electoral history, citizens will also participate in direct party elections, selecting three of the seven eligible political associations (ururo) to attain national party status (xisbi qaran) for the next decade. Somaliland limits the number of parties permitted to compete in elections to avoid a 1960s-style proliferation of political groups. Political associations allow political activity outside these main groupings. This move will broaden the political options available to the Somaliland public. The nature of this dual election has tied the political fortunes of these aspiring associations with the two main presidential candidates. Currently, all associations have aligned with one of the major parties: Kulmiye has formed partnerships with Hilaac and Horseed, while Waddani is aligned with Kaah, Barwaaqo, Talo-Wadaag, Shacabka, and Rejo.

In August this year, Waddani announced a coalition with the largest political association, Kaah, led by the former minister of civil aviation and Kulmiye veteran Mahmoud Hashi Abdi. This coalition suggests a likely victory for Kaah in the party elections, having effectively capitalised on public dissatisfaction with the Bihi administration by endorsing Irro as a presidential candidate early on. Perhaps more significantly, the coalition agreement includes a 30% allocation of cabinet positions in Irro’s future administration for Kaah, which will be a major success if Waddani maintains their commitment.

Meanwhile, UCID, the oldest of the three parties, continues to struggle for relevance following the collapse of its 2021 parliamentary coalition with Waddani. Successive electoral defeats have hindered UCID’s ability to position itself as a credible alternative to the Kulmiye–Waddani duopoly. Nevertheless, its continued presence reflects the enduring importance of sustaining a multi-party system, even if this system is becoming increasingly superficial.

Partisan tensions

The Bihi administration has been widely criticised for authoritarian practices and perpetuating harmful societal divisions, most disturbingly through the resurgence of clan-based tensions. Last month, Vice President Abdirahman Saylici broke ranks and announced his support for the Barwaaqo political association in the upcoming party elections. In his speech, he said that “in recent years, it appears that we [Somaliland] have diverged from the democratic process we chose”, accusing the national parties of exacerbating tribal tensions in spite of their anti-clannist founding principles.

Despite this, the Waddani party has positioned itself as the sole alternative, tapping into public disillusionment with the Bihi administration through its recent Walaaleeye campaign tour. The tour has strongly resonated across much of the country’s eastern regions, where communities are grappling with the collapse of state security structures and discontent with the “western-centric” status quo in which three of Somaliland’s six regions—Togdheer, Sool, and Sanaag—have been designated international red travel zones. Yet Waddani’s manifesto offers only vague promises on resolving Sool’s uncertain status, ranging from conciliatory talks to the implementation of unspecified development projects.  

Seemingly omitted from Waddani’s plans are concrete measures to address the economic marginalisation that fuels recurring unrest in the region. Since 2009, Sool has been allocated 2% of the national budget, with funds often consumed by bureaucracy and state-affiliated traditional elders. The 2022 budget reported that 90% of projects from 2018 – 2021 had been completed, though the renovation of public offices is difficult to reconcile with the over 100 assassinations in the region since 2009 – a sinister pattern that culminated in the murder of a local Waddani politician Abdifatah Hadrawi in December 2022, marking the official beginning of the conflict.  

Additionally, Irro’s targeted outreach to President Bihi’s subclan strongholds has drawn criticism, with concerns of Isaaq unity potentially occurring at the expense and further marginalisation of non-Isaaq clans. Though some in the party consider the move a required first step in rebuilding national unity, as one Waddani supporter told me: “If we, Isaaq, can’t be fair among ourselves, how can we expect to treat our fellow brothers—the non-Isaaq—justly?”

Further anxieties over governance during the election have been raised by the conspicuous lack of impartiality among state institutions, a trend that emerged back in May when Somaliland’s National Army released a controversial statement seeking support from western “allies” to counter Waddani’s alleged “pro-China” stance. This political entanglement now appears to have extended to other state agencies, with officials from the central bank, the head of Somaliland’s civil service commission, and the chief of the national police force all campaigning for the Kulmiye party. This pervasive partisanship has seemingly contributed to unrest in southern Hargeisa, where armed Kulmiye supporters, seen patrolling the streets, were implicated in the fatal shooting of a young man. Police say that eight individuals connected to the incident have since been arrested, yet the episode has heightened fears that political affiliations may be compromising state security, with recent arrests of National Intelligence Agency members further fuelling these concerns.

Additional questions of impartiality surfaced when Mohamed Ali Bile, Director of the Presidency, was fined 20 million SLSh by the National Electoral Commission for campaigning at Hargeisa’s war memorial, though Ismail Yare, former interior minister and senior Waddani official contended that police had permitted Bile’s use of the space having previously forbade Waddani. These incidents have deepened public concerns over the abuse of state bodies, though the National Electoral Commission itself has thus far avoided disrepute.

Testing the limits of ‘compromise and consensus’

Over the past two years, Somaliland has grappled with a political deadlock only recently resolved through the mediation of the Habar Jeclo committee in late August 2023. Historically considered a swing voting bloc within the Isaaq clan, the committee comprising the subclan’s traditional leaders, was tasked by the government and opposition to resolve the impasse in a manner that satisfied both parties. This traditional mediation had come as a last resort following disputes over election timelines, which intensified quickly amid a series of events that threatened to undermine national security.

The political deadlock dates to June 2021, the beginning of what the opposition refers to as the president’s “extension plot.” Somaliland’s constitution stipulates the presence of three national parties, with the respective Law No. 14/2011 giving them ten-year licences. The government’s proposed amendments to this law aimed to introduce direct elections to determine the next three national parties, effectively downgrading the current parties – Waddani, Kulmiye, and UCID – by May 2022 to political associations that would compete alongside others to regain their national party status. This marked a radical shift, as national parties were previously chosen through municipal elections, as in 2012 when Waddani replaced UDUB.

The previous parliament passed these amendments in June 2021, but President Bihi initially vetoed them on July 20, citing conflicts with the election cycle. However, his veto letter was returned to the new opposition-controlled parliament after the 21-day window in which the president can block a bill, making the approved amendments law by default. The opposition alleged that President Bihi had intentionally delayed returning the letter following a poor set of results for Kulmiye in the May 2021 elections. The government, backed by its 28 MPs, maintained that the law had already taken effect, while the opposition coalition, led by Waddani and UCID, objected, viewing the move as an attempt to obstruct their fair participation in the presidential election.  

The situation escalated in December 2021, when the government declared that “in line with the law”, political associations in the country were open. The opposition opposed the government’s notion that the national parties were now merely political associations, given their licences were due to expire one month after the scheduled presidential elections on the 26 December 2022. The government doubled down, accusing the opposition of impeding the democratic process. In January 2022, the Supreme Court issued an ambiguous decision that failed to clarify matters, further deepening the political impasse. The government then announced that party elections would be held first, with the three newly formed national parties then competing in presidential elections. However, back in June 2021, a senior member of Kulmiye, Abdikarim Hinif stated that holding both elections so close together would be unfeasible, strongly implying that one would be postponed. The opposition, in protest, maintained that the constitutionally mandated presidential election, already two years overdue, should take precedence.  

The initial half of this political deadlock exposed deeper issues within Somaliland's political framework, namely the concentration of power in the executive, the monopolisation of the national parties, and challenges to the Electoral Commission’s independence with the remaining commissioners of the previous body unilaterally resigning in June 2022. Disregarding the violent crackdown on opposition protests and the new Electoral Commission’s decision to implement a 9-month road map to elections, the upper (unelected) chamber of parliament, Guurti, declared a two-year extension for President Bihi and a five-year extension for itself (its term expired in May 2022).  

The opposition declared the extension void, with tensions reaching boiling point by July 2023, amid a devastating conflict in Sool, when militiamen entered the Gacan Libaax mountains demanding the incumbent to hold presidential elections. The emergence of the group, led by SNM veteran Oof-Wareen marked one year since the use of excessive force against civilian opposition protests in Hargeisa, Burao and Erigavo. In response, the government sent the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), leading to several clashes in which a reported nine officers were killed and seventeen were injured. The conflict resolution proposed by the Habar Jeclo committee entailed the demobilisation and pardoning of the Gacan Libaax militia, alongside financial compensation to the families of the fallen officers.

In light of this eventual agreement, the protracted standoff has left many wondering whether the democratic process has been compromised. Some leaders of the newly competing political associations have expressed their frustration with the decision by the Habar Jeclo committee to hold party and presidential elections simultaneously. Abdillahi ‘Darawal’ of the smaller Horseed party, until recently, had boycotted elections, denouncing the decision as “illegal”. Professor Ahmed Ismail Samatar of the Hilaac party has similarly argued that the constitution has been undermined and noted the lack of consultation of non-Isaaq clans, although he has on several occasions supported President Bihi and has since formed a coalition with Kulmiye.

More worrying, perhaps, is the way the political associations have taken shape. No doubt a symptom of present societal fragmentation, the main political associations, Horseed, Barwaaqo and Hilaac, are largely based upon regional, clan or sub-clan affiliations despite Article 9, Section 3 of the constitution explicitly forbidding this. This development starkly contrasts the campaign to establish political organisations back in the early 2000s, which aimed to eliminate clan delegates as political entities. Despite the successes of clan interventions in the 1990s, conscious efforts were made to prevent their institutionalisation, exemplified by its exclusion in the national constitution. The current behaviour of these parties, now functioning as clan and regional representatives, underscores the profound failures of Somaliland's political system, once lauded for its pragmatism.

An economy on the edge

As the election approaches, economic anxieties are also weighing heavily on the public. Recently, small traders in Hargeisa reported historic devaluations of the Somaliland Shilling (SLSh), with rates fluctuating between 12,000 SLSh and 15,000 SLSh per dollar. A series of crises, including COVID-19, the Waaheen market fire and the Sool conflict, combined with the two-year political deadlock, have contributed to the perfect economic storm.  

According to the Ministry of Finance Development 2023 Annual Economic Bulletin, inward remittances decreased by 30% compared to the previous year, resulting in $240 million fewer dollars circulating in the economy. This shortfall appears to have pushed the government to rely on alternative means to accrue foreign currency, notably through the sale of public land in the capital’s centre (Police Line) to the likes of Dahabshiil and the owner of Somcable Mohamed Aw Said. Coverage of these transactions has been minimal or explicitly removed, likely due to sponsorship ties with most of Somaliland’s mainstream ‘independent’ media outlets.

But political instability since 2021 is only one part of the present economic woes. In the months before President Bihi’s ascent to office in November 2017, the country experienced similar instances of currency devaluations. Between 2016 and April 2017, Somaliland’s Chamber of Commerce reported a 26.6% drop in the value of the Shilling and under President Silanyo, the controversial introduction of the 5,000 Shilling note in 2011 set a precedent for further currency printing - a practice that has continued, albeit with fluctuating levels transparency.

Present public concerns centre around the central bank’s perceived inability to regulate the widely used digital money exchangers or ‘sariflayaasha’, who have proliferated into a “black market” in recent years. The lack of regulation has resulted in digital exchange rates often exceeding those set by the central bank, which intervened four times last year to stabilise the market. In response to public outrage this month, The former Deputy Director of The Central Bank took to social media to clarify that the bank’s authority has been severely limited since 2010. The removal of the bank’s authority to effectively regulate exchange markets coincided with the emergence of oligopolistic practices under the first Kulmiye administration.  

The rise of mobile money payments since 2009 through platforms Zaad (Telesom) and Edahab (Dahabshiil) has long been considered a contributor to inflationary pressures in Somaliland. Many ministers in President Silaanyo’s cabinet, including Hersi Haji Ali, the then-minister of presidential affairs (now chairman of the Waddani opposition party), maintained close ties to Dahabshiil, having previously held senior positions within the company and its subsidiaries (i.e., Somtel). A 2018 report by the Clingendael Institute described President Silanyo’s government as an “unprecedented illustration of the dominance of a transnational economic and political elite class.” In contrast, President Bihi has adopted a different approach by re-nationalising state assets and centralising power within a close patronage network, primarily composed of his family, trusted allies, and benefactors. This has aptly earned him the nickname “handaraab” (padlock), symbolising his tight grip on the nation’s finances.  

Back in 2018, in a controversial bid to curb inflation, President Bihi mandated that all mobile payments under $100 be conducted in Somaliland’s national currency. This policy was intended to stabilise the exchange rate by discouraging the use of US dollars as a functional currency in the local economy. At the time, the late Ismail Mahmoud Hurre (Buba) of the Waddani party criticised the policy: “Rather than put in place policies that might injure local business adversely, it is better to deal with the root problem which is the out of control minting of new currencies”. He also accused the outgoing Silanyo administration of flooding the market with cash to conceal the dwindling reserves of dollars allegedly being syphoned off by ministers.

Six years later, the Waddani presidential candidate accused the government of printing 350 billion SLSh (roughly $40 million) to bribe voters. “The people of Somaliland cannot be bought for $40 million,” he declared. This statement followed earlier concerns raised by World Remit founder Ismail Ahmed in September 2023 about “excessive” devaluation caused by over-printing. He accused the Central Bank of depositing money with the printing company De La Rue to print 380 billion SLSh. The bank, constitutionally required (Article 13) to protect the national currency, denied these allegations and threatened criminal proceedings, though Ahmed provided an invoice from De La Rue dated February 2023, which proved otherwise.  

If the allegations from Ismail Ahmed and presidential candidate Irro prove to be true, dramatic measures will be needed beyond November 13th to prevent what could become a Zimbabwean-style collapse of the national currency to 20,000 SLSh per dollar.  

Yet, with these deep-rooted economic anxieties, the question of change or continuity remains. Is meaningful change in this election possible, or will the interests of an entrenched business elite continue to dominate? The opposition’s promises of reform have resonated with swathes of the public still contending with conflict in the eastern regions and a worsening economy. Yet, Irro’s willingness to break the cycle of oligopoly and centralised power remains uncertain given the haemorrhaging of Kulmiye officials to Waddani since 2021.

Final thoughts

As Somaliland heads to the polls on November 13, the public faces a choice between continuity and the promise of change amidst complex issues of economic instability, clan divisions, and a climate of increasing authoritarianism. Whether this election will truly usher in a new era or cement existing power dynamics remains uncertain. In the end, the resilience of Somaliland’s democratic principles will be measured not by the outcome at the ballot box but by the actions taken when the dust settles.