Somaliland’s election: moving beyond heego and huwan

Politicians and public figures in Somaliland have turned to name-calling and populist rhetoric. This diverts attention and energy away from the more serious discussions that need to take place about the country’s future. 

As Somaliland prepares for its election in November, political tensions are escalating, with parties and public figures on social media resorting to labelling each other with terms like heego and huwan.   

The term heego first gained prominence during the tenure of Abdi Mohamoud Omar, also known as Abdi Iley, the controversial former president of Ethiopia’s Somali region. His administration was characterised by authoritarianism, including killings, kidnappings, and torture aimed at intimidation by a paramilitary force known as the liyu police, which operated under his command. Consequently, heego was initially used to describe a loyalist faction supporting this regime. Over time, however, the term became pejorative in Somaliland, where such authoritarian impulses have been mirrored, according to Muse Bihi’s opponents, by his administration. Thus, heego has come to refer to those perceived as corrupt or aligned with oppressive political regimes. 

On the other hand, huwan has deeper roots in Somali history, dating back to clan politics and conflict. According to a study by B. W. Andrzejewski and Musa Galaal, huwan refers to “territorial groups that cut across clan divisions”. More broadly, it is also used to denote forces or groups allied in warfare. The term symbolises alliances formed for strategic purposes, particularly during periods of inter-clan conflict. 

These words carry significant historical and political weight and further polarise the electorate. Instead of engaging in meaningful policy debates, parties are using these labels to discredit one another. 

To fully understand the damage caused by this rhetoric, it is important to explore the origins and current usage of these terms, as well as why Somaliland’s political discourse must move beyond this mudslinging for its democracy to mature. Over the past couple of years, there have been earnest calls for improved dialogue, which few reasonable voices have responded to. Nevertheless, the problem persists, with many figures—both political and from the public—sabotaging every political argument with such ad hominem attacks.  

The revival of heego and huwan in Somaliland’s politics  

In current Somaliland politics, heego and huwan have taken on new meanings, primarily used to signify opposing political stances. 

Heego is now used to describe politicians from the ruling party, which, following its aggressive actions against civilians and journalists— including the detention and killing of protesters and the politicisation of national intelligence—has acquired the authoritarian characteristics of the former Somali region’s ruling regime. The term paints a picture of a group willing to oppress and exploit the political arena while advancing their own (clan) interests. 

Heego is now used to describe politicians from the ruling party, which, following its aggressive actions against civilians and journalists— including the detention and killing of protesters and the politicisation of national intelligence—has acquired the authoritarian characteristics of the former Somali region’s ruling regime. 

On the other hand, huwan is commonly used to suggest that an opposing party is being influenced or allied with outside forces, clans, foreign governments, or non-state actors. It functions in much the same way as kacaan-diid (counter-revolutionary) during the Barre era, or qaran-dumiis (state destroyer) in contemporary Mogadishu, referring to those who brought down the Barre regime in the early 1990s and who are alleged to want to do the same today.  

This term labels an individual as an enemy of the state, rather than merely an adversary of the ruling party, thereby implying a threat to the welfare of the population. 

The term huwan, which translates as “cloaked”, was revived during the conflict between Somaliland state forces and the Khaatumo-SSC militias that occurred last year and remains unresolved. Elites in Hargeisa alleged that the clans in the eastern region had gathered other subclans and allied with a neighbouring state, Somalia, to fight against Somaliland state forces.  

In its historical context, the term evokes the idea of implicit outside influence or intervention, whether regarding clan or ideological affiliations, hiding behind a cloak. It is often used negatively to question the authenticity or loyalty of a group’s actions. This accusation can be politically damaging, as it casts doubt on the opposition’s loyalty to Somaliland’s national interests, portraying them as compromised or beholden to powers beyond Somaliland’s borders. 

This trend of labelling opposition parties (representing rival clans) as huwan has also been used as a scapegoat by the ruling regime on numerous occasions, including in the aftermath of the peaceful protest in Hargeisa in August 2022, during which state forces responded by killing and arresting civilians. A similar heinous response was directed at civilian protests in Las Anod in December of the same year. In both instances, the regime sought refuge in accusing these citizens of harbouring an implicit anti-Somaliland agenda.  

Generally, this rhetoric is not new or unique to Somaliland; in fact, it is common in electoral environments for parties to call each other names with the intention of defaming or damaging each other’s reputations. Academics who have studied the topic in the US have described it as “political incivility” and are generally ambivalent about whether it is an electorally successful strategy.  

 This trend of labelling opposition parties (representing rival clans) as huwan has also been used as a scapegoat by the ruling regime on numerous occasions, including in the aftermath of the peaceful protest in Hargeisa in August 2022, during which state forces responded by killing and arresting civilians. 

 

Cas Mudde, an expert on European populist parties, categorises populist name-calling as a form of “thin-centred ideology” that seeks the lowest common denominator that binds people together against another group defined as not truly being among the “pure people.” Whilst it can be effective at defining an enemy however, Mudde says the ideology is thin because it has less to say on “what the best economic or political system is”.  

However, what makes Somaliland’s situation more complex and concerning is the lack of any topics for political dialogue beyond those aimed at gaining clan loyalties and invoking historical clan conflicts. This is a curious problem, given the serious questions the country needs to address regarding its future—whether that involves strategies for gaining recognition, the development of public services, or determining what kind of foreign policy will best serve its citizens. 

This manipulation of language for political gain has given rise to a cheap form of politics, where critical issues are sidelined in favour of divisive rhetoric. In the lead-up to the previous elections, such labelling became commonplace, with terms like Soomaaliweyn—which carries a similar connotation to huwan—being employed to fragment the electorate further, reinforcing group divisions and fanning the flames of distrust.  

 This manipulation of language for political gain has given rise to a cheap form of politics, where critical issues are sidelined in favour of divisive rhetoric. 

These terms, however, are not homegrown. Both heego and huwan are political imports, borrowed from foreign contexts and repurposed in Somaliland’s political dialogue. This reliance on external labels reflects the broader stagnation of creative political thinking in the country. Instead of formulating original ideas or engaging in meaningful dialogue, Somaliland’s political actors have resorted to regurgitating imported political labels. The outcome is a landscape where meaningful policy discussions are overshadowed by shallow identity politics, and where these labels have taken on connotations that obscure real issues. 

Acknowledging the harmful impact of this divisive rhetoric, the National Electoral Commission has intervened to address the situation. Last week, the commission convened all political parties to sign a code of conduct, urging them to refrain from using such polarising language in their campaigns. It also fined the main parties, Kulmiye and Waddani. This meeting marked an important shift, reflecting a growing recognition that these tactics are damaging Somaliland’s political cohesion. 

To reinforce this commitment, the commission established a supervisory committee tasked with monitoring compliance with the code of conduct, aiming to mitigate the negative impact of labels like heego and huwan. This move is designed not only to curb divisiveness in the upcoming election but also to promote a healthier, more unified political climate moving forward. 

With additional research by Ibrahim Osman