What’s in a name: Mogadishu and Hargeisa’s identity issues

Somaliland has rejected Somalia’s attempts to force companies doing business there to change their naming conventions. Mogadishu’s new strategy will only negatively impact civilians who rely on these services on both sides of the divide.  

The crisis between Somalia and Somaliland has entered an unusual phase, with Mogadishu attempting to reassert control through the regulation of names and labels. In late August, the Somali government issued directives to airlines operating flights to Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, mandating that the name Somaliland be removed from their schedules and replaced with Somalia. Airlines failing to comply would face a ban from Somali airspace. Flydubai and Ethiopian Airlines, the two international carriers operating on that route, swiftly adhered to the directive, despite Somaliland issuing its own counter-directive in response. 

Similar directives have been issued to financial institutions and money transfer companies, citing violations of state sovereignty. Mogadishu also plans to extend these measures to maritime ports. 

These decisions raise concerns about their potential impact on the residents of Somaliland. Hargeisa remains firm in its opposition, viewing these actions as Mogadishu’s overreach and an infringement on its independence. However, the reality is that essential services are increasingly caught in the political cross hairs of this dispute, potentially affecting the livelihoods of those dependent on these services. 

Mogadishu’s Escalation  

On 21 August, the Somali Civil Aviation Authority sent two letters to Flydubai and Ethiopian Airlines, requesting that they amend the address of Hargeisa Airport to read “Hargeisa – Somalia.” Both airlines compiled within the three-day deadline set by the authority. However, the tone of the letters differed despite their identical message. The letter to Flydubai was titled “Urgent: Incorrect Representation of Destination,” while the letter to Ethiopian Airlines was more assertively titled “Urgent: Required Action Regarding Sovereignty Violation,” which was really just a distillation of the issues Somalia has with Ethiopia. 

The Somali Civil Aviation Authority’s letter to the Emirati company was written in a balanced tone, clearly outlining the breached regulations and requesting compliance. In contrast, the letter to the Ethiopian company was much sterner, revealing prior discussions on the same issue on August 14 and the Ethiopian carrier’s failure to abide by the request. According to the letter, the Somali Civil Aviation Authority had previously requested Ethiopian Airlines and the Ethiopian Civil Aviation Authority to remove the name Somaliland and replace it with Somalia before making the same request to FlyDubai.  

Ethiopian Airlines complied with the directive by removing Somaliland but did not add Somalia to the Hargeisa Airport listing, a move that was rejected by the Somali Civil Aviation Authority.  

In response, the Somaliland Civil Aviation and Airports Authority issued a statement rejecting what it described as an illegal threat from the Somali government. The Authority committed to working with Fly Dubai and Ethiopian Airlines to ensure the safe and secure operation of flights. It also issued both companies a 21-day ultimatum to correct what it referred to as the incorrect designation of airports in Somaliland, specifically requesting the removal of Somalia from the names of Hargeisa and Berbera airports.  

The implications of these actions raise several concerns. Confusion could arise due to conflicting designations of the flight destination to Hargeisa, leading to significant complications should Mogadishu escalate further, such as by requiring non-Somali citizens to obtain visas to enter Hargeisa through Somali embassies abroad. Moreover, communication between Somalis globally could become more challenging if Somaliland retaliates by imposing visa requirements on non-Somaliland citizens, despite its current policy of allowing entry to all Somalis, regardless of nationality or documentation, without a visa. 

Furthermore, the financial burden on residents of Somaliland, especially those travelling from the Somali diaspora, could increase due to potential changes in flight ticketing. Given Mogadishu’s ongoing financial struggles and recurring budget deficits, airlines operating flights to Hargeisa may be pressured to pay additional taxes and fees, which would likely be passed on to travellers. 

Financial confrontation  

Hargeisa has also strongly addressed the directives concerning money transfer companies. The Somali ministry of commerce and industry issued a mandate titled Order Concerning the Protection of the Unity and Sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Somalia, instructing companies operating in both Somalia and Somaliland to remove the latter’s name from their financial service listings and replace it with Somalia. The statement warned that any company violating the country’s sovereignty and unity would face legal consequences. In response, Hargeisa’s government, through its minister of information and culture, Ali Hassan Mohamed, issued counter-warnings to the money transfer companies, stressing that “any company complying with Mogadishu would commit a serious crime against the six million people in Somaliland.” 

The implications of this decision are more severe for Somaliland residents compared to the directives concerning airlines. Whilst airlines operate in a regulatory environment with relatively standardised rules which places added pressure on them to comply with Mogadishu’s demands, the one-week deadline given to money transfer companies is insufficient should they opt to comply. Additionally, Hargeisa's warnings against compliance with Mogadishu’s orders place the companies, and the millions of people reliant on their services, in a challenging and uncertain position. 

Mogadishu has seemingly overlooked the vital role that money transfers play for citizens and governments in both Somalia and Somaliland. In 2017, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that these transfers amounted to $1.3 billion, representing around 20% of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, the actual volume is likely higher due to unrecorded flows, highlighting the need for improved data collection to capture the true extent of these remittances. 

The repercussions of Mogadishu’s directives won’t only affect residents of Somaliland but will also have far-reaching consequences for millions of Somalis in the diaspora and within Somalia itself, all of whom rely on a vast network of financial transactions that existed long before the establishment of the federal government in Mogadishu. Money transfer companies now face a difficult dilemma: comply with Mogadishu’s orders and risk retaliatory measures from Somaliland or refuse to comply and face unclear legal consequences in Somalia, where the alleged violations remain vaguely defined.  

The implications of the escalation  

In connection with the above, the circle of disputes between the two parties will witness significant escalation, contradicting the understandings reached during multiple rounds of prior bilateral talks. One such understanding was reached during a round hosted by Ankara on April 13, 2013, which included the “encouragement and facilitation of international aid and development provided to Somaliland.” Mogadishu has undermined that agreement by making decisions that specifically target the citizens of Somaliland and not its government. This escalation is a direct response to the memorandum of understanding signed earlier this year between Somaliland and Ethiopia. The memorandum includes provisions such as leasing land along the Gulf of Aden to Ethiopia for the establishment of a military base, in return for Ethiopia recognising Somaliland’s independence and offering it a share in Ethiopian telecommunications or aviation companies. Mogadishu has framed this agreement as a violation of its territorial integrity by a hostile neighbour.  

Somalia’s response can be summarised in three key points. First, Mogadishu has sought to forge alliances with partners to build military deterrence against the implementation of the memorandum. This includes signing a defence and economic agreement with Turkiye in February and a military cooperation agreement with Egypt in August.  

Second, it has engaged in indirect negotiations with Ethiopia, aiming to pressure the country into withdrawing from the memorandum. Third, Mogadishu has attempted to exert pressure on Somaliland by disrupting international aid, issuing recent directives concerning airlines and money transfers, and likely planning to introduce similar measures soon. 

In response, Somaliland is unlikely to succumb to these pressures and will adapt accordingly. Hargeisa may draw strength from its close relationship with Taiwan, which faces a similar predicament, as both regions are pursuing independence while being denied recognition by the international community for political reasons. However, the comparison differs in one crucial respect: unlike Taiwan, Somaliland has the capacity to resist any forceful action from Mogadishu. What is certain is that these escalating actions will only serve to further distance Somaliland — both its government and its people — from Somalia, reinforcing their determination to achieve independence. 

It may also lean on erstwhile allies like Ethiopia and the UAE for diplomatic and communications support. Indeed, prominent pro-Emirati and pro-Prosperity party commentators have already taken up the cause of Somaliland’s independence.  

Recently, Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre of Mogadishu hinted at a willingness to resume negotiations with Somaliland, contingent upon the formation of a new government following the upcoming general elections. Some view this as a reference to Mogadishu’s possible reliance on a different approach from the opposition party, Waddani, which is widely expected to win the elections. However, Mogadishu’s recent escalatory measures against Hargeisa have revealed a strong political and public consensus in Somaliland, reinforcing the call for independence. This was confirmed by Waddani Party leader Hirsi Ali Haji Ali in a post on X, where he stated: “Somaliland is one nation, and Hamza Abdi Barre’s statements aim to divide our people.” He also emphasised that his party’s vision is “the independence of Somaliland and fraternal relations with its neighbours.” 

Escalation scenarios  

Mogadishu has shifted its management of disputes with Somaliland to a new front, one that threatens the daily lives of citizens, whom it holds accountable for the political disagreements. Observers believe that Mogadishu has not yet exhausted its list of escalation measures. Sources close to the Somali Ports Authority have revealed plans to impose measures and fees on international shipping lines operating at the Port of Berbera, to assert control, which it aims to achieve by collecting fees for port services, docking, and staying.  

It is likely that Mogadishu will proceed with this step, especially since it is counting on increased port revenues and tax revenues to reduce the overall budget deficit. In confirmation of this, Somalia’s ambassador in Addis Ababa posted on X platform that his government will take measures to protect the country’s sovereignty concerning ports, pointing to upcoming directives for maritime shipping lines.  

Based on this, several potential scenarios could unfold concerning airlines, money transfer companies, and maritime shipping lines. The first scenario involves compliance by money transfer companies and maritime shipping lines, like airlines. In this case, these companies would face punitive measures from Somaliland, resulting in the cessation of their services within the region. This would allow Somaliland to signal its determination to defend its sovereignty and independence, albeit at the cost of imposing a near-blockade on itself. 

This scenario would fulfil Mogadishu’s objective of making Somaliland’s population bear the consequences of the crisis, including its economic and political repercussions. 

The second scenario involves airlines complying with Somaliland’s directives while money transfer companies and maritime shipping lines disregard Mogadishu’s orders. 

Consequently, these companies would lose the ability to operate in Somalia, with Somalia’s citizens shouldering the financial and economic burden. This would be a diplomatic and commercial coup for Somaliland. It could also resemble an implicit recognition of Somaliland’s independence by international companies and countries, as seen with the UAE and Ethiopia. 

Somaliland’s refusal to abandon the memorandum will likely prompt Mogadishu to continue escalating, potentially including the use of force to assert control. Somalia’s maritime agreement with Turkey could play a role in enforcing control over shipping lanes. Mogadishu may also resort to filing complaints in international forums related to the services sector or suing international companies operating in Somaliland. 

This situation mirrors the experiences of the Iraqi government in Baghdad with the Kurdistan region. Therefore, Mogadishu’s success in its plans will depend on the response of other countries, particularly regarding Flydubai and Ethiopian Airlines, as their positions will reflect the stances of the governments of Abu Dhabi and Addis Ababa towards the crisis. 

Conclusion  

These escalatory measures by Mogadishu contradict the central objective of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government, which is national unity. The people of Somaliland will not accept being part of another state due to sanctions and threats; instead, they will become even more determined to secure recognition of their independence. This issue requires genuine discussion focused on the interests of all Somalis. Moreover, these measures put the pro-unity minority in Somaliland, particularly the MPs representing Somaliland in the Somali Federal Parliament—whom the Somaliland government does not recognise—in a difficult position. Mogadishu is effectively presenting them with two difficult choices: either support these measures, which Mogadishu claims promote unity but ultimately harm their families or align with their families and support the call for independence. In either case, Mogadishu will have achieved the opposite of its intended goal.